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Received 9 Sept. 62 25X1

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Executive Assistant to the DD/S

**SUBJECT:** The Headquarters Courier Systems

1. This memorandum is submitted at the request of [redacted] your office to give the status within the Office of Security of action toward implementing the recommendation of the Inspector General concerning the Headquarters courier systems.

2. The Office of Security had made an extensive security survey of the courier systems, and submitted a detailed report, dated 9 February 1960. Thereafter the Inspector General's Office conducted a supplemental investigation; its report, dated 29 November 1960, expressed general agreement with the OS report and made similar and additional recommendations. Since that time, representatives from this office and yours have had various discussions relating to the matters set forth in both reports.

3. Using the order of listing of the Inspector General's recommendations as given us by [redacted] the following is the status of the matters within the Office of Security, and our understanding of the action taken or to be taken by other DD/S components:

Recommendation No. 1: "That the Office of Security conduct a survey of the Agency's procedures for classified document control to insure proper compliance with Executive Order 10501 and pertinent Agency regulations."

a. The wording of this recommendation, out of context of the reports, appears too broad. As stated, it encompasses what amounts to a substantial portion of the continuing work of various components of the Office of Security. Insuring compliance with EO 10501 and Agency regulations as to classified document control is one of the major functions included in the regular work of the Office of Security. It is

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part of the separate security surveys continually being made of individual Headquarters components, of specific activities, and of the Agency's [ ] installations.

b. The recommendation was made in both the IG and the OS reports. In each case it followed statements of findings relating to the use of courier and documents receipts. For the present purposes, it can be considered that the recommendation is intended to apply only to this phase of classified document control.

c. The IG recommendation came after a finding that there is a lack of uniformity in the use of courier and document receipts. The OS report made the same general finding, but only as to intra-Agency transmittals, noting that document receipts are required for transmittals outside the Agency; within the Agency, the use of such receipts is optional with the sender for material SECRET and below. A new Courier Receipt and Log Record Form 240 had been placed in use in 1958, and was intended to correct some of the faults in intra-Agency deliveries, but is used by only about half the Agency.

d. Executive Order 10501 does not require the use of receipt forms for transmittal within an agency, but leaves this matter to the discretion of the head of the agency, specifying only "good accountability records." Subsequent to the submission of these reports, the Executive Staff of OS reviewed the Agency accountability controls, has prepared certain relatively minor revisions in the Regulations which now are in process, and believes that the Regulation requirements conform to the provisions of EO 10501. The surveys upon which the OS and IG reports were based presumably noted all instances in which practices did not conform to Regulations, so that this particular recommendation actually encompasses many of the others.

e. It would appear that the best manner of farther implementing this specific recommendation is to make it one of the phases of the next security survey of the Headquarters courier systems. It is planned to conduct such a new survey after the various components to be housed in the new Headquarters Building have completed their move, and what amounts to a rather completely new courier system operation is in effect.

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Recommendation No. 2: "When bulk deliveries are made ... it is recommended that a manifest-type receipt be prepared ... and the courier insist on inventory and receipt at time of delivery."

a. In the OS report this recommendation followed statements that on deliveries of RI pouches to State Department the courier did not wait for the recipient to inventory the separate pouches inside a mail sack, but left the sack and a later courier would pick up the receipt. This practice is contrary to that of other agencies on their bulk deliveries to CIA.

b. There is no question about this recommendation, which should be implemented by Mail & Courier Branch, OL, at once, if it has not done so already. The practices noted violate basic security principles.

Recommendation No. 3: "That an Agency handbook be prepared and published that would consolidate all official directives ... and make it easier for clerical help to follow ..."

a. This is an OS as well as an IG recommendation. The preparation of the handbook would be a task for OL, with a security review by OS before its issuance.

Recommendation No. 4: "That representatives from the Office of Logistics, Office of Personnel, and Office of Security meet to consider and adopt better ways and means to prevent the improper transmissions of classified material that sometimes occur when postage slips are lost or become detached from the registered mail or package."

a. The situation here is that,  a considerable volume of mail is sent out by various components as if it were private or commercial correspondence, and regular postage stamps are used. Under present practices, this type of mail is sent to Mail & Courier Branch with an attached form directing the use of stamp postage. If the form becomes detached from the mail, the letters may be sent as metered mail, that is, through the postage meter, which is possibly traceable to the Agency, prints the postage meter marking, and is not in conformance with the intent of the component sending the correspondence.

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b. Any system of forms or other instructions from the component to the mailing point is subject to mistakes or failures. We now suggest for your consideration a new approach to the problem which should eliminate the step susceptible to failure. Why not establish postage accounts at, and supply postage stamps to, the component which prepares the mail and would itself affix the postage?

Recommendation No. 5: "Instruct all couriers to: (1) Deliver classified material to the addressee or authorized-named representative only. (2) Request proper identification from all recipients prior to delivery of classified material. (3) Under no circumstances deliver classified material to unauthorized persons."

a. This IG and OS recommendation should be implemented by Mail & Courier Branch, OL. The instructions actually are standard practices which all couriers should follow, and generally do; it was only the infrequent lapses disclosed in the OS report which made the recommendation necessary.

Recommendation No. 6: "The Chief, OCR Liaison, prepare a memorandum for all Agencies and Departments with whom couriers make contact, requesting their cooperation in asking CIA couriers to identify themselves properly before turning classified materials over to them. All offices in CIA to be similarly notified and requested to ask couriers to show their courier's identification credentials."

a. After the submission of the OS report, OCR did send such a memorandum, but only to Army, Air Force, Navy, and State. It is understood from our discussions with [ ] that he has been dealing with OCR to have it send a similar memorandum to its liaison points in all other departments and agencies with whom we have courier pick ups and deliveries.

Recommendation No. 7: "Provide courier-drivers with a trip manifest or similar card to report times of arrival and departure at all facilities visited. Require supervisors to take daily readings of speedometer mileage as a check against the trip manifest."

a. The Mail & Courier Branch, OL, has implemented this recommendation by adopting the use of automobile trip records. Whether or not supervisors are studying and checking

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these to serve their intended security purpose, would be one of the points to be covered in the next security survey.

**Recommendation No. 8:** "That the Office of Logistics and the Office of Security jointly investigate the feasibility and practicability of reducing the number of delivery points in the Pentagon (now numbering 30) by the establishment of a special center at the Pentagon to be manned by two or more Agency employees whose duties will include internal delivery and collections to these offices."

a. This is a management problem, rather than a security one. The study should be made by OL itself, and not with OS. OS would review the details of any proposed new system for conformance to security requirements.

**Recommendation No. 9:** "That the focal point in the Office of Security be designated the office of record for maintaining a complete roster of all headquarters couriers and courier equipment, and that the Director of Security provide a staffing slot for a full-time courier inspector."

a. In the IG report this recommendation followed ones that OS designate a focal point to handle matters relating to the courier systems (No. 16 here), which OS has done; and that a DD/S directive be issued to have all components provide OS with data on a current basis as to their courier systems (No. 10 here), which is discussed next.

b. Neither part of this instant recommendation is feasible. The maintaining of such rosters would be an administrative task involving work serving no direct security purpose. A problem exists because various components have established special courier systems to serve their particular special problems. The regularizing of the courier systems and the centering them at such a place as the Mail & Courier Branch, OL, probably is the answer to both the general problem and this specific recommendation. This might follow the management study which is Recommendation No. 15.

c. Adopting the other part of the instant recommendation that a full-time OS courier inspector be provided, would involve creating a specific position which would be difficult to justify.

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The security problems relating to the courier systems are numerous, but they are being handled by the present action of various parts or personnel of the Office of Security as specific matters arise. Many of the security problems would be eliminated upon the implementation of some of these other IG recommendations.

**Recommendation No. 10:** "That (1) the DD/S issue a directive to all units of the Agency employing individual couriers not assigned to the Mail & Courier Branch, Office of Logistics, to provide the Office of Security ... (complete details of their courier systems); and (2) the Office of Logistics in coordination with the Office of Security review these data to eliminate wherever practicable duplication of courier services, courier routes, and courier vehicles."

a. No directive is necessary to obtain the desired information when and as OS had a need for it, as is demonstrated by the OS security survey report. To require Agency components formally to submit the data on a regular basis to OS and to keep it current, and to maintain records of it in OS, would be an administrative burden upon the components and OS which would not serve any direct security purpose. Perhaps the information should be submitted regularly to some point, but not OS; it might help toward reducing duplication of courier systems, but only if the reviewer of the data had authority to do something about it.

b. Neither OL nor OS has authority to eliminate courier work which duplicates that of the Mail & Courier Branch. The corrective action could be taken by the DD/S following the recommended management study.

**Recommendation No. 11:** "(Failure to qualify in use of Firearms.) Individuals so affected to be reported to the Office of Security for arms requalification without delay."

a. This recommendation has been implemented, and the situation corrected. Actually, the OS survey report disclosed only one instance where a courier authorized to carry firearms possessed a credential which had expired. This was at the Executive Registry and, as the report discloses, it is only on

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rare occasions that its couriers carry firearms. Following the OS security survey, this courier requalified in the use of firearms and was issued a new credential.

**Recommendation No. 12:** "That the DD/S request the Director of Security to extend his current technical interrogation program to all Agency couriers; and that he be instructed to initiate a positive CI program designed to minimize the damage to National Security and embarrassment to the Agency should a serious breach of security occur."

a. The first part of this recommendation refers to the fact that OS has a program under which all couriers of the Mail & Courier Branch, OL, are polygraphed once a year. Some other courier groups also are included in the program, and it is scheduled to add the OCI couriers as soon as the work load permits.

b. The second part of the recommendation is that the Director of Security be instructed to initiate a "positive CI program" as to the couriers. Careful consideration should be given before this recommendation is adopted. It is not felt in OS that there is any necessity at this time to take any further steps than those presently in effect as to courier personnel.

c. When a person is recruited for a courier position, or assigned from elsewhere to such duties, he is subjected to special close scrutiny and screening beyond that of ordinary applicants; there are cases where a person has been approved for general employment but not for courier work. Although there are no regulatory provisions requiring this, OS fully realizes the security hazard potential attaching to courier work; and any courier later may be assigned to duties requiring one of the special types of clearances entailing personnel security requirements somewhat greater than those for regular Top Secret staff employee clearance. Thereafter, a courier is repolygraphed every year. Beyond this, the couriers come under the regular CI programs applying to all Agency personnel, and any reported security violation as to couriers or courier material is given careful investigation. Couriers are a channel between this and the other USIB agencies, so that any noted irregularities are

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subject to report by the other security systems as well as ours. This totals to a rather good security program.

d. Implementation of the other security recommendations as to courier procedures and as to improvements in the supervision of couriers, will further decrease the possibility of security compromises of classified material placed in the courier channels. Working towards perfecting the operations of the courier systems may be a better immediate approach towards effecting their greater security than any action pointed towards their personnel.

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Recommendation No. 13: "Paragraph [ ] Agency Regulation [ ] . states that the Director of Security is to ... conduct internal counterintelligence programs ... Paragraph [ ] goes on to state ... establish safeguards necessary to prevent physical penetration ... Nowhere in the regulations is specific mention made of couriers or the Agency Courier System, nor requires the Director of Security to give this activity special attention."

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a. There are various activities within the Agency to which the Director of Security gives special attention without any regulatory requirement that such be done. The courier systems are given special attention, as shown by the statements under the preceding recommendation. No change in, or addition to, the regulations is necessary in this regard.

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Recommendation No. 14: "When courier escort is not provided, all vehicles used by couriers will be equipped with [ ] for [ ] classified material while in transit. Wherever feasible, a two-way radio telephone should be installed."

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a. This recommendation is being implemented by the Mail & Courier Branch. It has obtained three [ ] vehicles. Radio equipment has not been installed, but costs of such (about \$5,000) have been obtained.

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Recommendation No. 15: "That the Management Staff conduct a study of the various courier systems at Headquarters with a view of reducing duplication."

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a. This recommendation is being implemented, of course, by the present work of your office. OS will give whatever assistance may be requested.

**Recommendation No. 14:** "The DD/S instruct the Director of Security to establish a point within the Office of Security to coordinate on all matters relating to the Headquarters Courier Systems, and the individual security of couriers themselves and the Courier System."

a. [ ] a special assistant in this office, has been assigned this task, and has been coordinating with your [ ]

**Sheffield Edwards**  
**Director of Security**

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